Economic Competition and the Energy Sector: The Electricity and Natural Gas Markets by Campos, Josefina Cortés & Motta, Eduardo Pérez
Economic Competition and the Energy Sector: The Electricity and 
Natural Gas Markets
Josefina Cortés Campos, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México
Eduardo Pérez Motta, Agon
Prepared for the study, “The Rule of Law and Mexico’s Energy Reform/Estado de Derecho 
y Reforma Energética en México,” directed by the Baker Institute Mexico Center at Rice 
University and the Center for U.S. and Mexican Law at the University of Houston Law 
Center, in association with the School of Government and Public Transformation at the 
Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey, the Centro de Investigación 
para el Desarrollo A.C. (CIDAC), and the Faculty of Law and Criminology at the 





















© 2017 by the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University 
 
This material may be quoted or reproduced without prior permission, provided 
appropriate credit is given to the author and the James A. Baker III Institute for Public 
Policy. 
 
Wherever feasible, papers are reviewed by outside experts before they are released. 
However, the research and views expressed in this paper are those of the individual 
researcher(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the James A. Baker III Institute 
for Public Policy. 	
Josefina Cortés Campos 
Eduardo Pérez Motta	
“Economic Competition and the Energy Sector: The Electricity and Natural Gas Markets”	




A project of this magnitude and complexity is by necessity the product of many people, 
some visible and others invisible. We would like to thank Stephen P. Zamora of the 
University of Houston Law Center and Erika de la Garza of the Baker Institute Latin 
America Initiative in helping to conceive this project from the start. We would also like to 
acknowledge the support received from Luis Rubio and Verónica Baz of the Centro de 
Investigación para el Desarrollo A.C. (CIDAC); Pablo de la Peña and Alejandro Poiré of the 
Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey; and Oscar Lugo Serrato and 
Manuel Acuña of the Law School at Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León. The 
collaboration between our institutions and the material and moral support were key to this 
project’s success.  
 
We would also like to acknowledge the logistical support and project coordination 
provided by Lisa Guáqueta at the Mexico Center, as well as the efforts of all of the authors 
that participated in this study and the many silent hands that helped put together 
workshops, events, and meetings related to this project. We also thank the peer reviewers, 
editors, style correctors, and translators, and Tirant lo Blanch.  
 
This study is dedicated to Stephen P. Zamora, our friend and colleague and one of the 
driving forces behind this project, who passed away before the completion of this study.  
  
Economic Competition and the Energy Sector	
	3 
About the Study: The Rule of Law and Mexico’s Energy Reform/Estado 
de Derecho y Reforma Energética en México 
 
The 2013 changes to the constitutional framework and the summer 2014 enabling 
legislation in Mexico’s energy industry represent a thorough break with the prevailing 
national narrative as well as the political and legal traditions of twentieth century Mexico. 
Mexico is about to embark on an unprecedented opening of its energy sector in the midst 
of important unknown factors, as well as a fiercely competitive and expanding 
international energy market. Mexico is one of the last developing countries to open its 
energy sector to foreign investment, and although there are important lessons that can be 
learned from other countries’ experiences, this does not imply that the opening will be 
necessarily as successful as the government promises or that the implementation of the 
new laws will go smoothly. Almost certainly, after the enabling legislation goes into effect, 
important questions of law will emerge during the implementation, and unavoidably, 
refinements to the legislation will have to take place.  
 
The book “Estado de Derecho y Reforma Energética en México,” published in México by 
Tirant lo Blanch and written in Spanish, is the culmination of a major research effort to 
examine rule of law issues arising under the energy reform in Mexico by drawing on 
scholars and experts from American and Mexican institutions in order to bring attention to 
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Introduction  	
On June 11, 2013, the Mexican Congress approved the most recent constitutional reform 
dealing with economic competition. Without a doubt, this is one of the most important and 
notable actions of the government in power. Through constitutional determination, the 
new Federal Commission of Economic Competition (COFECE) was set up, which, in its 
capacity as a autonomous constitutional body, was vested with a set of new powers aimed 
at eliminating barriers to competition and free market participation, regulating access to 
essential consumables, and ordering the separation of assets for the purpose of eliminating 
their anticompetitive effects. 
 
In terms of of sanctions and procedures, it is noteworthy that the reform has established 
special penalties to severely punish monopolistic practices and concentration phenomena. 
It announced specific prohibitions related to cross-subsidies and preferential treatment 
and limited the means of defense to indirect amparo (protection) proceedings, while, at the 
same time, reserving such disputes for specialized courts.1 
 
The aforementioned regulatory changes are valuable in and of themselves because they 
were aimed at strengthening economic competition in Mexico. Even though the economic 
competition policy is the result of more than twenty years’ development and, after 
successive reforms, the existing regulatory framework approaches the best international 
practices in terms of its design, it is certain that the conditions under which some economic 
sectors operate in Mexico reflect a reality that is still far from a competitive marketplace, 
and the benefits that such markets generate.2 This situation is especially obvious in sectors 
that operate through network infrastructures. 
 
The situation described above can be attributed to specific factors of an institutional, 
political, economic, social and/or cultural nature that together condition the effective 
application of competition standards. Nonetheless, it is also pertinent to point out that each 
sector or market offers a different panorama that needs to be recognized both by the rules 
of competition as well as by the regulation of that industry. Based on such consideration, in 
this paper three types of elements or conditions are presented that, if not recognized in a 
timely manner by the industry regulator and by the entity with jurisdiction, may limit the 
effective application of the most recent reform in the natural gas and electricity industries.  
 
First, we will show the main obstacles documented by economic regulation in terms of 
creating competitive markets in the industries mentioned above. Second, we will refer to 
the different developments and maturities of the natural gas and electricity markets in 
Mexico. Third, we will present some of the elements that may limit the development of 
competitive markets on the level of regulatory design of the energy sector.  
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The Energy Sector and Its Natural Resistance to Competition 	
Technical, Economic, and Social Conditioning 
The design of regulatory models that can be applied to different markets for goods or 
services must start with the acknowledgement of the set of technical, economic, and even 
social conditions inherently related to the different productive activities that will be subject 
to regulation. In the case of the energy sector, such acknowledgement has received a lot of 
attention in the specialized literature, as certain conditions of the energy markets are 
precisely what make it so difficult to articulate regulatory goals and can limit the 
competitive development of such industries. Such a condition has suggested that in energy 
markets—particularly among those operating through network infrastructures, such as 
electricity and natural gas—traditional competition analysis is not applicable, and it is 
necessary to design more sophisticated analyses. The following are some examples:3 
 
Gas and electricity markets exhibit a vertical structure that is conditioned by large amounts 
of investment, by levels of production with decreasing outputs by scale, and in some cases, 
by the presence of high sunken costs, traits that lead to very long process of capitalization 
and recovery of investment and, in some segments, the presence of natural monopolies. 
This condition requires that the regulatory framework that applies to such sectors operate 
under conditions of stability, transparency, and in consideration of goals consistent with 
the characteristics of the industry, considering that it is only in such a scenario that 
participants can set up adequate commercial strategies that have effective economic 
consequences.  
 
In the gas market, a consumable derives its price based on the price of oil (a substitute 
good), and the supply is composed of domestic product and gas from imports. This opens 
the possibility for the operation of wholesale markets4 and makes the integration of 
regional supply blocks viable; as a result, its regulation faces the challenge of incentivizing 
and articulating markets that, due to their economic impact and geographic location, go 
beyond national borders. 
 
In turn, electricity is a preferred good that impacts all productive processes, does not have 
any substitutes, and presents a demand that is almost perfectly price-inelastic. 
Furthermore, electricity represents secondary energy that cannot be stored on a large scale. 
The aforementioned characteristics create some problems, among them the difficulty of 
making provisions over the medium or long term based on the energy contributed by the 
different types of plants, and the technical and economic impossibility of a single power-
generating technology covering the entire demand for electricity. 
 
Based on these conditions and from a public policy perspective, in matters related to 
electricity, incentives must be provided for the diversification of sources of energy, and for 
ensuring that economic regulation successfully allows agents competitive pricing on 
technologies of different origin that also exhibit fluctuations throughout the day in 
accordance with the relationship between demand and installed capacity. Therefore, the 
establishment of spot markets, market operators, and system operators is recommended. 
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So far, we have only referred to some technical and economic conditions of the gas and 
electricity sectors; however, in order to understand the difficulty that such sectors pose 
both for regulation as well as for the rules for the defense of competition, it is also 
necessary to refer to the specific social impact of such sectors. 
 
Electricity and gas represent a basic service for citizens and companies; they are goods that 
are crucial for quality of life, social interrelations, industry, transportation, and 
communications. Therefore, regulation strives to guarantee the regular and continuous 
functioning of such productive segments at all times and proceeds to apply techniques of 
administrative intervention such as public service, general interest activities, or universal 
services, techniques directed at ensuring equality of access for users, continuity, 
adaptability, quality and efficiency of service, transparency in terms of its management, 
and non-discriminatory treatment of users.  
 
Additionally, to the extent that these productive activities have repercussions on the 
environment, regulation tends to pursue the goal of promoting the rational consumption 
of energy and the lowest environmental impact through the incorporation of clean 
energies. However, it can also be observed that in the name of the social and 
environmental impact of these industries, generalized policies of subsidies and regulations 
with public burdens have been established that occasionally operate to the detriment of the 
competitive functioning of the sectors.  
 
Industry Trends 
Based on the acknowledgement of the characteristics described in the preceding section, 
the regulatory models that have liberalized the gas and electricity sectors have generally 
focused on the incorporation of markets both in terms of generation/production as well as 
distribution and supply. Additionally, regulation tends to be established that is aimed at 
guaranteeing access for third parties to the central networks of the systems; under certain 
circumstances, measures are adopted that lead to the vertical disintegration of ownership 
of the transportation, storage, and distribution networks. 
 
Regarding such models and their effective operation, the literature regarding economic 
regulation has reported the difficulty of generating significant competition in the 
aforementioned segments, which prevents the participants in the sector and consumers 
from receiving and responding to the signals of a contestable market. Among the 
documented problems, the following are noteworthy:5 
1. Significant asymmetries between competitors so that incumbents have more 
incentives to exercise market power.  
2. Barriers of entry as a result not only of the presence of sunken costs, but also of the 
vertical integration between transportation and supply activities, capacity 
restrictions on small competitors, and the existence of switching costs.  
3. Lack of transparency regarding pricing and asymmetrical information between 
entering companies and existing market participants. For example, it has been 
observed that the fact that competition in electrical markets requires “repeated 
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interaction” between a reduced number of economic agents, with transparency 
regarding price, demand, and indirect knowledge of the costs of their rivals, could 
give rise to collusive agreements in terms of price setting, particularly between 
companies with similar cost structures and capacities. 
4. Network congestion making it possible for competitors who are located in 
congested regions to increase prices without the risk of being displaced by 
competitors located outside the network congestion points. Such a condition 
requires a much more precise determination of the relevant market, with special 
attention being paid to network restrictions and the influence that competitors have 
over them. 
5. The low price elasticity of the demand for electricity, which only reinforces the 
market power of its generators, a trend that is exacerbated by the fact that 
consumers cannot stockpile this commodity to cover periods of high demand. 
6. The technological convergence between gas and electricity. Although this may exert 
competitive pressure from one productive sector  upon the other, it might also limit 
the entry of independent retailers into the market. 
7. Lack of investment, which is associated with long recovery processes, particularly in 
sectors such as electricity, which furthermore requires a margin of reserve to ensure 
supply. 
 
The aforementioned characteristics have caused the specialized literature to focus its 
attention on the creation of tools and regulatory models that make it possible to better 
characterize and simulate the functioning of oligopolistic markets, upon which the 
analyzed productive processes tend to operate. Among such tools, we have the following: 
the spot market vs. long-term bilateral contracts, rules for price setting by auction, 
regulatory mechanisms for the recognition of sunken costs, capacity payments, virtual 
capacity sales for larger companies, indicators of market shares, corporate decisions 
accompanied by sophisticated competition analyses that permit vertical integration 
between generators and traders, and open access databases for competitors. 
 
The Mexican Energy Sector: The Same Name for Markets of Different 
Stages 	
Having described some factors that favor oligopolistic trends and anticompetitive behavior 
in the energy sectors operating through network industries, it is necessary to refer to 
another element that must be considered both by the entity with jurisdiction as well as by 
regulators: the recognition of the condition of the natural gas and electricity markets in 
Mexico, considering that the most recent reforms in energy matters and economic 
competition must operate in these industries. 
 
This analysis is relevant because, unlike in the hydrocarbons sector where the energy 
reform faces the challenge of transitioning from a monopoly forged over almost 76 years 
to a competitive market, in the case of gas and electricity reform must start with the 
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acknowledgement that the Mexican legislation of the 1990s, approved within a context of 
commercial openness driven to a large extent by the signing of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), advanced in terms of the liberalization of both sectors—
particularly in the case of natural gas—so that the introduction of an open-competition 
model in such productive segments is not entirely unknown, although there is an 
industrial/corporate dynamic which imposes its own path towards the new legal 
framework under which the energy markets will operate. 
 
The Natural Gas Sector in Mexico 
The first policy of the liberalization of the gas industry took place in 1995 through the 
adoption of a legal framework that strove to implement an efficient industrial structure 
based on the incorporation of markets in potentially competitive fields and sectors and the 
regulation of both natural and legal monopolies. Specifically, private investment 
participation was established for the transportation, storage, distribution, and national and 
international trading of natural gas.  
 
Throughout the 18 years of its duration, the regulatory model that was incorporated in 1995 
fostered the receipt by Mexico of significant levels of domestic and foreign investment 
both in distribution as well as import, storage, and regasification terminals.6 However, one 
of the main design problems created by such a regulatory model was the dominant role in 
the industry reserved for Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX Gas y Petroquímica Básica or 
PGPB).  
 
Although according to the domestic legislation, PGPB was required to operate as a 
regulated agent of the new market, it remained in charge of first-hand sales—in its position 
as the only domestic producer—and of the operation of its transportation network, 
retaining the ownership and operation of its pipelines as the main permit-holder of the 
system. Although subject to the obligation of providing open and non-discriminatory 
access to the networks, it was also qualified to carry out storage and trading activities.  
 
The industrial architecture of this first industry-opening model had two clear 
components:7 a public sector that through national companies (the Federal Electricity 
Commission [CFE] and PEMEX) consumed 90% of its production without any incentives 
for efficient production, and a private sector forced to import two-thirds of its 
consumption through PEMEX, which controlled the National Pipeline System.8 What were 
the repercussions of this model? 
1. The position of PEMEX as a monopolist of first-hand sales created distortions in 
terms of competition for the remainder of the segments, insofar as PEMEX was 
operating as a dominant agent in transportation and trading. 
2. The permanent setting of prices and its poor reflection of market dynamics 
discouraged potential competition.  
3. In Mexico, bringing gas to a region for the first time was, for many years, subject to 
an anchor project, such as CFC electric power plants, which made it possible to 
guarantee consumption and use of the gas pipeline and offered profitability to the 
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investor in the new infrastructure, although they did not represent a structural 
solution aimed at strengthening incipient markets. 
 
In summary, the industry-opening model of the 1990s promoted an industrial and 
corporate structure that helped characterize Mexico as a country with low volumes of 
extraction,9 a high level of natural gas flaring10 associated with the extraction of crude oil, 
and a gas pipeline system that, particularly since 2011 and as a result of the lack of public 
and private investment, showed clear signs of saturation and gave way to an intensive 
import policy with effects on the final consumers.11  
 
As stated in the most recent reform,12 in view of the described scenario, the drive to utilize 
natural gas should be a central part of the energy policy of the federal government. 
Competitive markets not only strive to achieve diversification of the primary energy 
sources of Mexico in order to advance toward energy security efficiently, but also seek to 
protect the environment.13   
 
The Profiles of the New Model: Natural Gas 	
The new regulation model applicable to the natural gas industry represents a clear 
expansion of the regulatory model incorporated in 1995. Under the new constitutional14 
and legal framework, the participation of private domestic and foreign investment in the 
exploration and exploitation of oil and gas is permitted and, therefore, the legal monopoly 
under which PEMEX had been operating in hydrocarbon production and first-hand sales is 
eliminated. The new legislation maintains the central regulatory elements of the preceding 
regulatory model, although it incorporates important additions in market regulation and 
on an institutional level, such as the following examples:  
1. The principle of subsidiarity. The general principle of private participation is 
established in all segments of the natural gas industry so that only in properly 
justified cases will the state participate directly through assignments in 
infrastructure development.15 
2. Bidding as the general rule for the assignment of qualifying titles. Contracts for 
exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons will be granted by bidding and 
assigned through an auction system.16 
3. Permits. Processing, transportation, storage, and distribution still require the 
granting of permits with a term of up to 30 years,17 a requirement that also 
applies to trading, import, and export. In no case will exclusive permits be 
granted, except for permits for natural gas distribution via pipeline determined 
beforehand by the Energy-Regulating Commission (CRE). Permits may be 
transferred to another party upon a request filed by the party with the 
administrative authority and after obtaining the opinion of the Federal 
Commission of Economic Competition (COFECE) for the purpose of preventing 
cross-participation in activities.18 
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4. Principles of operation of services. Activities carried out by permit holders will 
be subject to the principles of homogeneity, regularity, continuity, guarantee of 
supply, uniformity, and non-discrimination in terms of quality, timeliness, 
quantity, and price.19  
5. Separation of activities (transportation-storage-distribution via pipeline-trading). 
According to the new legal framework, the same party will be able to hold 
different permits that apply to the different industry segments;20 however, in 
order to promote prices based on market competition and to avoid conflicts of 
interest and anticompetitive practices, rules are established that restrict the 
activities that are carried out by each industry participant:21  
a. Natural gas pipeline transportation and storage permit holders will not be 
able to trade hydrocarbons except in cases of emergency, acts of God, or 
force majeure.22  
b. Traders of natural gas will be able to participate in the capital stock of permit 
holders for pipeline transportation and storage activities related to the same, 
provided that they do not exceed the limits established for such purposes by 
the CRE. Cross-subsidies are expressly prohibited.23  
c. PEMEX will be authorized to participate in the trading of natural gas 
provided that it makes transparent the information regarding the costs of 
services offered to its users.24 
d. Integrated systems. Natural gas pipeline transportation and storage systems 
that are interconnected can set up “integrated systems” in order to expand 
coverage or provide system benefits in terms of improvements in safety, 
continuity, quality, and effectiveness in the provision of services.25 
e. Non-compliance with regulations on rates, separation of activities, and 
improperly discriminatory practices, and with resolutions issued by the 
COFECE are some of the reasons for cancellation of permits.26  
6. Open access. Permit holders who render services of transportation, distribution, 
and storage via pipelines are under obligation to provide open access to their 
facilities and services through interconnection in a non-discriminatory manner 
and through consideration.27 
7. Capacity and restrictions on hoarding. The design of the transportation 
infrastructure considers an excess capacity that makes it possible to cover the 
needs of personal consumption by users and of trading with third parties. 
However, users who do not effectively use their capacity reserve should make it 
available on a secondary market that must be governed by open processes and 
rules preventing discriminatory practices.28 
8. Regulation favoring competition and asymmetrical regulation. The CRE will 
issue regulations on prices, rates, and maximum considerations for the different 
regulated activities until a declaration of effective competition as determined by 
COFECE exists.29 Additionally, general regulatory competence is established, 
based on the opinion of the entity with jurisdiction, in order to promote efficient 
development of competitive markets in those sectors. Among others aspects, 
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such rules may establish strict legal separation between permitted activities or 
the functional, operational, and accounting separation of the same; cross-
participation; the issuance of codes of conduct, limits on participation in the 
capital stock, as well as the maximum share that economic agents may hold in 
the trading market; and, as the case may be, in the capacity reserve in the 
transportation pipelines and storage facilities.30  
The first-hand sale of natural gas will be regulated by the CRE and must be 
carried out at the processing or injection points. Trading by persons under the 
purview of PEMEX or its subsidiary agencies will also be subject to asymmetrical 
regulation in order to limit the dominant power of such persons; this rule will be 
in force until increased participation of economic agents is achieved, promoting 
efficient and competitive development of the markets.31 
9. Institutional design: 
a. Centralized planning is entrusted to the Ministry of Energy (SENER), with 
the technical opinion and regulatory powers of the National Hydrocarbons 
Commission (CNH) and the CRE.32  
b. Institutional strengthening of coordinated regulating bodies. Both the CNH 
as well as the CRE will have their own legal personality, technical and 
administrative autonomy, and budgetary self-sufficiency, meaning that they 
will have revenue from contributions and the use of their services.33 
c. The National Natural Gas Control Center (CENAGAS) will be in charge of 
independently managing the national transportation and storage pipeline 
system for fuel.34 This organization will be entitled to auction strategic 
natural gas transportation projects through transparent and competitive 
processes and may also receive support from productive state-owned 
companies.35 
 
The Electrical Sector in Mexico 
Prior to the most recent reform, the industrial and institutional structure of the electrical 
sector reflected the constitutional restriction that established state exclusivity in the 
generation, conduction, transformation, distribution, and supply of electric energy to 
provide a public service through its decentralized organizations (the CFE and, until 2009, Luz 
y Fuerza del Centro). 
 
It is important to point out that the aforementioned constitutional law did not exclude 
private participation in the sector in an absolute way. Therefore, in 1992, within a context 
characterized by the high consumption of energy, a great dependency on energy from 
hydrocarbons, the absence of electrical services for 25% of the population, and an 
enormous financial deficit of the CFE, an important legal space was opened to come up 
with new industry-financing solutions based on private capital.  
 
The main goal of the 1992 reform36 was the creation and express recognition of a new 
electricity-producing segment open to domestic and foreign private initiative. To this end, 
the new legal framework included the figures for independent production of electrical 
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energy (PIE) and small production, redefined the figures of self-sufficiency and 
cogeneration of electricity, and permitted individuals to import electricity for personal 
consumption purposes, as well as for export. However, 21 years later and in the context of a 
growing demand for energy,37 stagnation of the productive infrastructure, complex 
industrial organization, high dependency on thermal energies,38 the need for investment, 
and a manifest insufficiency of public resources,39 the viability of the electrical sector 
under the 1992 regulation model has remained doubtful.  
 
Some indicators that may clearly illustrate the need for regulatory change required by this 
sector are the following: Mexico’s effective capacity of electric energy generation in the 
North American region;40 the distribution of energy losses, which are up to 15% (practically 
double those of other member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development [OECD]);41 the level of public service coverage, which historically has not 
reached 100% in rural areas or areas difficult to access;42 and the pricing level, which has 
traditionally stayed below cost as part of a policy of macroeconomic and social stability 
(30% subsidy), while Mexico’s electricity fee for industrial consumption is one of the 
highest among OECD countries.43 
 
Additionally, it is important to point out that although it is certain that the CFE currently 
generates most of the electricity, over the years private investment in the electricity 
generation has been consolidated and now represents 36.7% of the total installed capacity 
and accounts for 47.8% of the nation’s authorized generation of energy. As a matter of fact, 
some claim that over the coming years more than 50% of investment will come from the 
private sector.44  In any case, it must also be pointed out that the lack of competition in 
terms of electricity generation and the presence of long-term contracts may also have 
added to the delay in incorporating infrastructure with state-of-the-art technology.45  
 
In light of this scenario, it is simple to recognize the goals that needed to be established by 
the most recent reform of the electrical sector: to guarantee, through a competitive market, 
a reliable, efficient, and safe supply of electricity coming from diversified generation 
sources, at a lower cost and with less environmental impact not only to ensure a social good 
of paramount necessity, but also to promote domestic economic growth. 
 
The Profiles of the New Model: Electricity 	
In the case of the electrical sector, the reform represents a substantial modification of the 
system of industrial organization insofar as it is aimed at overcoming the monopsony, or 
single-buyer, model to instead establish one of free competition in the segments of 
generation and trading, while at the same time permitting private participation in the 
segments of electrical transportation and distribution through contracts with the CFE.. The 
characteristics of the new model are as follows:  
1. Planning and control of the National Electrical System are strategic areas for the 
state and as a result, no private participation is permitted.46 
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2. Transmission and distribution. In such segments, which also represent strategic 
areas subject to the regulation of public service,47 it is permitted for the state, 
through CFE or other productive state-owned companies, to enter into 
contracts48 with domestic or foreign individuals that are subject to rate 
regulation and conditions for the provision of services, for the purpose of 
financing, maintaining, managing, operating, and expanding the infrastructure 
necessary to provide the public service of electric energy transmission and 
distribution. In any case, it is up to the CFE to provide transportation and 
distribution services; for this purpose, it will remain subject to a regulation that 
provides incentives for the expansion and efficient operation of networks. 
Carriers and distributors will operate in accordance with instructions from the 
National Energy Control Center (CENACE) and will participate in network 
expansion and modernization projects as determined by SENER.49  
3. Generation and trading.50Under the new legislation, these activities represent 
areas open to the free participation of private parties, both domestic and foreign, 
in which the state also participates through its productive companies. These 
activities will operate subject to rules of free competition and within the 
electricity market. These activities, plus the importation of energy linked to the 
National Electrical System, remain subject to the granting of permits by the 
CRE, except in the case of electricity generation that is less than .5MW, that is for 
personal use, in cases of emergency, during service interruptions, or in the case 
of isolated power supply (subject to authorization).51  
4. Wholesale electricity market. This is the space where energy transactions will be 
carried to reflect  the costs of supplying energy through the national electric 
system.52  Every day, generators will report their offers based on generation cost, 
while traders and qualified users will report their demand. The CENACE, in its 
position as operator of the spot market, will determine the level of generation 
that makes it possible to cover demand at the lowest price possible considering 
the restrictions of the electrical system, and will calculate the balance price. It is 
important to note that, parallel to the market, participants will be authorized to 
enter into long-term contracts among themselves based on freely negotiated 
energy prices. The legislation distinguishes between qualified users53 and basic 
supply users. Qualified users will be able to participate directly in a wholesale 
market for electric energy, while basic supply users will be served by the CFE, 
which must purchase the energy through auctions to guarantee the lowest costs 
for users. The market will operate subject to rules of transparency and access to 
information in accordance with the criteria determined by the CRE.54  
5. Open and impartial access. This regulatory element strives to guarantee 
competition between public and private companies for use of the transmission 
and distribution networks.55 For this purpose, carriers and distributors are bound 
by  contract to connect electric power plants to their networks and to connect 
with load centers under conditions that are not unduly discriminatory, whenever 
this is technically feasible.56 
Economic Competition and the Energy Sector 
  14 
6. Separation of activities. The different parts of the electrical supply cycle 
(generation, transmission, distribution, trading, and provision of primary inputs) 
must be carried out under strict legal separation in order to foster open access 
and the efficient functioning of the sector. Likewise, the supply of basic services 
is separated from other modalities of trading, and carriers and distributors are 
not authorized to sell energy. Under the new legislation and without prejudice 
toward the authorities vested in the COFECE, SENER will establish the terms of 
strict legal separation that are required to foster open access and efficient 
operation of the electrical sector. The CRE will be authorized to establish the 
accounting, operational, or functional separation of the constituents of the 
electrical industry whenever necessary, according to its judgment, for the 
regulation of this industry.57 
7. Pricing regulation. The Ministry of the Treasury and Public Credit (SHCP) has 
the authority to establish final rates for basic service users. In turn, the CRE will 
regulate rates for transmission and distribution services, the operation of the 
providers of basic services, CENACE operation, and related services not included 
in the wholesale electricity market.58 
8. Conditions for the provision of public service. According to the legislation, the 
sector will operate under conditions of continuity, efficiency, and safety in 
compliance with the requirements of universal public service, clean energies, 
and reduction of contaminating emissions.59 
9. Declaration of conditions of effective competition: Whenever SENER, the CRE, 
CENACE, or any other person considers that conditions of effective competition 
in any market do not exist, they must request that COFECE carry out the 
appropriate analysis so that the necessary measures may be taken in order to 
establish conditions of free competition and participation, as the case may be.60 
10. Principle of energy sustainability. The participants in the electrical industry will 
have obligations regarding the incorporation of clean energies and the reduction 
of contaminating emissions.61 The legislation establishes a system of clean 
energy certificates through which SENER will determine the percentage of 
energy that must be generated from clean sources every year.62 
11. Universal Electrical Service Fund. This fund strives to finance electrification in 
rural communities and marginalized urban areas. Among other sources, the 
Fund will be financed through excess revenue resulting from the management 
of energy losses in the electrical market.63 
12. Institutional framework:  
a. SENER. This government body will be in charge of the centralized planning 
of energy policy. SENER will establish the initial conditions under which the 
market will operate64 as well as the necessary criteria for legal separation in 
order to guarantee open access to and the efficient operation of the electrical 
sector. SENER will issue the criteria for the granting of clean energy 
certificates and will ensure operation of the electrical market through its 
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power to impose sanctions. SENER will obtain technical opinions from the 
CRE and CENACE.65  
b. Institutional strengthening of coordinated regulating bodies. The CRE will 
have its own legal personality, technical and administrative autonomy, and 
budgetary self-sufficiency. Its main powers include regulating and granting 
permits for electricity generation, issuing authorizations for imports, 
establishing methodologies for the calculation of repayments, defining 
contractual models, determining the conditions for provision and carrying 
rates for transmission and distribution, setting maximum prices, determining 
the operating rules of CENACE, regulating connected services, and resolving 
disputes in interconnected matters.66 
c. CENACE. CENACE will be in charge of operational control of the national 
electric system as well as the operation of the wholesale electricity market; its 
most important functions include guaranteeing open and nondiscriminatory 
access to the national transmission network and general distribution 
networks, impartially establishing criteria for interconnection and available 
capacity, and proposing the expansion of networks for social benefit. This 
organization is in charge of engaging in the coordinating actions that are 
necessary to satisfy the demand for energy at the lowest cost and to provide 
the necessary stability for the electrical system.67 
 
Elements of Institutional and Regulatory Design: Possible Limits to the 
Operation of Competition Rules 	
In general, we believe that the constitutional and legal reform of the natural gas and 
electricity industries is correct in refining regulatory models whose objective is to ensure 
that such markets operate competitively. In the case of gas, the reform not only 
eliminates—at least in terms of regulations—the monopolistic position of PEMEX both in 
terms of production as well as first-hand sales, but also introduces new regulatory elements 
that have a favorable impact on the establishment of competitive markets, such as the 
obligation to grant open access, the separation of activities, the restrictions regarding 
capacity accumulation, and the management of the National Gas System by an 
independent operator. In terms of electricity, an industrial organizational model will be 
installed that overcomes the regulatory single-buyer scheme and creates markets in terms 
of generating and trading on the basis of private participation in the transmission and 
distribution segments. 
 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that these are reforms that create a significant 
regulatory burden, particularly in the case of the natural gas industry,68 which will require 
that regulators find a proper balance between the application of ex ante and ex post 
regulation and maximum transparency in the administrative procedures that need to be 
implemented in conjunction with such regulation. Regarding these objectives, some 
elements are presented below that may represent limits or delays in terms of the 
competitive operation of the new markets. 
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Necessary Institutional Coordination 
According to the legislation in force both in the case of electricity as well as natural gas, it 
can be affirmed that the laws do not succeed in clearly delimiting areas of competence 
regarding policy authority, regulatory authority, and proper management or 
administration authority.69 Additionally, it should be noted that the mandate of ensuring a 
highly competitive market remains, according to the new legal rules, in the hands of 
different authorities such as SENER,70 the CNH,71 the CRE,72 and, of course, COFECE 
itself.73 
 
The two characteristics indicated above may contribute to creating a balance of power 
among the different government bodies, although, in case the expertise and objectives of 
each body is not recognized, it might at the same time foster inefficient application of the 
new legal framework. In this respect, it must be noted that unlike the natural gas legislation, 
which recognizes the necessary institutional cooperation between COFECE and the 
industry authorities, in the case of electricity there are scenarios under which the 
administrative authority practically exercises functions that, based on constitutional 
mandate and expertise, are originally reserved for the competitive entity.74  This not only 
invites analysis in terms of legality but also calls for the necessary acknowledgement of 
institutional capacities. 
 
Under such an institutional model, it is essential to create effective coordination 
mechanisms75 and timely actions by government bodies that must not be limited to the 
imposition of regulation upon the participating players in the sector, but rather should, for 
example, first and foremost conduct an analysis of the natural gas and electricity markets 
that makes it possible to successfully arrive at a shared institutional vision regarding the 
sector with a view toward its subsequent and permanent monitoring. To date, unlike in the 
liquefied petroleum (LP) gas sector, where COFECE issued a declaration of effective 
competition for some geographic segments during the last ten years, in the case of natural 
gas, such a market analysis still remains to be carried out. 
 
Distinction between the Market Goals and Social or Distributive Goals 
One of the recurring challenges of network industries is the conciliation of and balance 
between economic, productive, and social interests that are inherently related with the 
industry. In this respect, price regulation will always be problematic, inasmuch as it must 
be ensured that the collection goals are properly reconciled with the competitive model. 
This supposition remains clearly confirmed by considering, for example, that the Electrical 
Industry Act establishes that the setting of rates for basic service will continue to be 
handled by the SHCP for the purpose of guaranteeing price stability for domestic users and 
low consumption, while the setting of  transmission and distribution rates, to be handled 
by the CRE, is intended to ensure through incentives that these activities reduce their 
costs.76 Under this model, Productive State Companies (CFE) could operate based on 
criteria of effectiveness that are different from those of the market. 
 
Furthermore, the application of the legislation in effect imposes upon the regulator the 
challenge of not limiting the benefit of competitive markets with respect to social or 
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productive projects. We refer in particular to the regulation regarding matters of national 
content,77 social coverage or strategic projects,78 and the obligations associated with social 
impact, sustainable development, and clean energies,79 as well as the so-called “Obligations 
of Universal Service,80 considering that the absence of transparent procedures, clear 
financing rules, and, in some cases, asymmetrical regulation could mean advantages for 
specific participants in the industry and excessive costs to the detriment of the market and 
consumers.  
 
Finally, an aspect that deserves particular attention is the fact that, according to the new 
electricity legislation, non-qualified users—who, in other terms, are associated with basic 
supply—remain excluded from the electrical market; this prevents this consumer segment 
from directly electing a supplier and, considering that basic supply will operate under the 
legal rules of the priority areas, might at the same time permit the generalized application 
of subsidies.  
 
Bidding Procedures: The Rule or an Exception? 
 
One especially noteworthy aspect of the new legislation concerns the changes that are 
introduced in matters of bids (market competition). 
 
Although it is certain that in the natural gas sector, the new legislation establishes that the 
assignment of contracts in hydrocarbon exploration and extraction is carried out through 
bidding rounds as a general rule, the reform introduced bidding procedures that are 
“diluted” to such a degree that, in some cases, they inexplicably exclude the participation of 
the competitive body. This eliminates a central stage of analysis regarding the detection of 
discriminatory requirements, unjustified restrictions in accordance with the nature of the 
project, and broad or narrow deadlines that may, as the case may be, favor the exchange of 
information between agents, and in general may lead to important omissions in terms of 
measures promoting and protecting competition. In particular, we are referring to the 
following procedures:  
1. Migration of assignments to hydrocarbon exploration and extraction contracts  
without any participation from COFECE during the design stage of bidding 
guidelines.81 
2. Contracts for natural gas exploration and extraction of may be awarded directly, 
without any bidding, to holders of mining concessions as long as the natural gas 
is contained in and produced by the mineral coal vein.82 Although this could be 
justified from a geological and operational perspective, it is certain that this 
scenario excludes, as a general rule, market response to the assignment of a 
productive project of this nature. 
3. Regarding the granting of permits for natural gas distribution via pipeline, the 
reform establishes that the CRE has the power to conduct bidding rounds, 
although the regulatory framework does not provide any more details with 
respect to the origin of this determination.83  
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4. The law permits directly awarding to PEMEX, any of its subsidiaries or affiliated 
productive companies, or any other productive state-owned company, a 
hydrocarbon trading contract with a term ending no later than December 31, 
2017, and which cannot be extended or renewed.84 We believe that the possible 
justification for such a bidding scenario is unclear, and that three years can have 
a significant impact on the competitive trend in the trading segment.  
 
Insofar as the granting of transmission and distribution contracts in the electrical sector is 
concerned, the legislation does not mention that the contract assignment mechanism is 
based on bidding rounds. Instead, it establishes that competitive processes will be applied 
that guarantee free participation, even though the law does not establish any specific 
criteria and procedures regarding this matter.85  
 
The aforementioned scenarios, insofar as they represent exceptions to the constitutional 
determination favoring bidding as the mechanism for the purchase and assignment of 
public resources, leave space for administrative discretion and make the rules of 
transparency and accountability that apply to such processes even more relevant.86 
 
Exclusivity of Distribution (Natural Gas) 
Unlike the prior legislation, insofar as the exclusivity of pipeline distribution permits is 
concerned,87 the regulatory framework in effect does not establish any specific period or 
any criteria of economic regulation that would support such a determination. These 
omissions are perhaps justifiable from the perspective of incentives for investment, since 
the absence of gains in effectiveness may favor the establishment of barriers of entry.88  
 
The Perspective of Integrated/Related Markets 	
One aspect that is deemed to have hardly been regulated by the new secondary legislation 
is the conditions that apply to the importation of energy. The fact that imports exert a 
relevant competitive pressure on the domestic market cannot be set aside; the legislation 
could have established not only qualifications for the performance of such activity, but also 
a legal framework giving greater certainty to the industry participants. For example, in the 
case of electricity, the legislation only establishes that the criteria to carry out such 
transactions will be determined via “market rules;”89 in the case of natural gas, the law only 
refers to the granting of permits by SENER.90 Additionally, it is notable that neither of the 
two industry laws mentions the effects on competition that could be the result of granting 
permits to operators who simultaneously participate in the natural gas and electricity 
markets, which, without any doubt whatsoever, deserves more thorough analysis in terms 
of economic competition.  
 
Asymmetrical Regulation 
As indicated throughout this text, the new legislation establishes broad regulatory powers 
not only in favor of SENER, but also of the regulators. In this respect, it can be agreed that 
the existence of established participants with market power in the energy sector (such as 
PEMEX for first-hand sales) requires, the imposition of asymmetrical regulation as a part 
Economic Competition and the Energy Sector 
  19 
of the effective operation of incipient markets, an issue that is specifically addressed by the 
legislation in the case of the natural gas industry.91  However, it is noteworthy that insofar 
as the electrical sector is concerned, there are no rules of such a nature, or at least no rules 
with a similar magnitude.  
 
Therefore, it is absolutely necessary that the body with jurisdiction participate in a timely 
manner not only in the process of the institutional reorganization of the electrical sector 
(CFE),92 but also in the stipulation of the rules according to which existing public and 
private entities participating in the wholesale electricity market must operate.93 
 
Certainty: The Condition for Investment 
Finally, an aspect of the reform that must be noted is that many of the central elements of 
the new regulatory model will be defined in general administrative standards issued by the 
industry regulator.   
 
In matters of natural gas, the following are included: price regulation, criteria for holding 
permits for more than one of the regulated activities as well as the conditions of their 
duration;94 rules of open access and interconnection procedures;95 rules for considering 
transportation and storage facilities as intended for personal use;96 rules for considering the 
origin of service suspension, one that might possibly be associated with anticompetitive 
conduct or be harmful, in the case of a shortage;97 and mechanisms and criteria to ensure 
that the general public will have access to information obtained regarding the activities of 
surface reconnaissance and exploration, and also of exploration and extraction, that are 
carried out by PEMEX, by any other productive state-owned company, or by any person.98  
 
Regarding the electrical industry, we may point out, the Operational Guidelines and Rules 
of the Electrical Market as an example,99 which, in addition to interconnection/ 
connection100 and auction design criteria,101 include the guidelines to determine improper 
use of privileged information,102 criteria regarding the obligation of continuity,103 general 
terms and conditions for the provision of services,104 criteria for the granting of permits,105 
and contractual and price-regulation models,106 among others. 
 
It is important to take into consideration that this peculiar legislative articulation, wherein 
not all regulatory contents mentioned above are a matter of law or even of regulation, 
represents a scenario with significant room for administrative discretion that, in terms of 
legal certainty, not only requires maximum transparency from the regulators, but also a 
solid technical basis and motivation.  
 
Public Policy Implications 	
The introduction of competition into the productive segments that operate through 
network infrastructures is normally the result of a long process involving changing the 
legal and economic rules that are applied to such sectors. As this involves changing the 
status quo, the reform process requires a change in the behavior and mentality of the 
agents and authorities that are involved in the sector. These are the characteristics that 
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have led to the affirmation that the reform of energy markets has not been completed 
anywhere in the world, and that revisions over time are required in terms of the 
effectiveness of the regulatory models implemented. With respect to this scenario, public 
policies aimed at operating in the energy sector must consider the following:  
 
First, the regulatory reforms must be supported by a permanent and comprehensive action 
program subject to rules of transparency, designed to achieve specific goals, and with a 
properly defined timeframe. To do so, it will be essential to take as a starting point the 
economic, technological, and social conditions of each sector as well as the stage of 
maturity present in each case of market introduction.  
 
Second, as part of the processes of introducing competition, the challenge of reconciling 
productive segments that operate under a monopoly and segments that are suitable for the 
operation of competitive markets will be expected to arise. . For such a delicate balance, it 
must be considered that comprehensive regulation tends to open the way for a greater 
number of public considerations that are potentially fragile for regulatory coverage. 
Additionally, it must be taken into account that part of the success in the introduction of 
competitive markets is achieved through regulatory stability.  
 
Third, the regulatory measures are designed, in theory, to operate on a temporary basis 
insofar as they “direct” and “emulate” the operation of the market. In this respect, it must 
be recognized that both the regulator and the competition authority essentially face a 
problem of information that requires designing bodies on an institutional level that are 
indispensable complements of economic competition public policy. Under such a scenario, 
the mechanisms of institutional coordination and the creation of preventive and corrective 
authorities will be key for operations to establish efficient markets.  
 
Fourth, to promote the efficient operation of markets, it will be necessary to clearly 
distinguish the different public policies and their goals, considering that in the name of 
public policies on tax collection or social policies, the positive effects of a competitive 
market may be diminished. 
 
Fifth, for the efficient operation of markets, transparency of the different administrative 
processes that converge in the sector and public access to the operational information of 
the markets are central elements of any regulatory model striving to introduce 
competition, particularly in sectors such as energy, where high levels of technical 
complexity, investment, and  social impact with respect to the goods and services that are 
produced come together. 
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1 The constitutional modifications in matters of economic competition gave rise to the 
issuance of the new Federal Law of Economic Competition, published in the Official Gazette 
of the Federation on May 23, 2014. 
 
2 One year prior to the aforementioned reform, the OECD had already pointed out that 30 
percent of the expenses of Mexican families, and 42 percent of the expenses of the poorest 
tenth of the population, are used in service markets where, on one hand, scenarios of 
scarce competition persist and, on the other, consumers spend around 40 percent more 
than they would spend in competitive markets. The international organization emphasizes 
that the lack of fierce competition in domestic markets inhibits the effectiveness and 
competitiveness of the Mexican economy and contributes to expanding income disparities. 
“OECD Perspectives,” 30  
 
3 This section is based on the studies contained in Cortés (2007: 15-37); Fabra and Fabra 
Utray (2010); Federico and Vives (2008: 4-13); Vives (2006); UNITED NATIONS-UNCTAD 
(2010: 2-25), and Knieps (2006).  
 
4 In the case of Mexico, it is correct to deem the substantial increase in the offering of this 
energy in the United States and Canada as well as a significant increase in their reserves as 
playing a decisive role in the national energy policy, a situation that has radically modified 
relative international prices, making North America the region with the cheapest gas 
worldwide and inclining the balance in favor of its exports. 
 
5 The literature tends to agree that in cases where countries have rigorously introduced the 
standard model of industry restructuring, there have been cases of success. For example, 
regarding the electrical sector Littlechild (2006: xviii-xix) cites the cases of the United 
Kingdom, Norway, and Texas as positive, among others. However, the literature also 
documents problems of incorporating competition with respect to the exercise of market 
power among the agents participating in the sector. The elements of analysis that are 
presented in this section are particularly based on the findings reported by the European 
literature based on the results contained in the Energy Sector Inquiry issued in 2007 by the 
General Directorate of Competition of the European Commission, as well as some 
resolutions by the British regulator Ofgem in 2009. Additionally, regarding the recorded 
trends, cases such as the following are quoted: concentrations between EDP and GDP in 
Portugal (2004); GDF and Suez; E.On and MOL (2006); E.On/ENDESA; and 
Enel/Acciona/ENDESA (2006). Regarding analysis of the United States, the literature tends 
to refer to the special powers in this respect held by the FERC that are exercised based on 
the Energy Policy Act of 2005, as well as Orders 670 and 674, which aimed at severely 
sanctioning market manipulation (Joskow, 2008: 22-23).  
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6 The projects of Ensenada, Altamira, Manzanillo, and Topolobampo are particularly 
noteworthy. 
 
7 Alberro, 177-178. 
 
8 Ministry of Energy, “Forecasts of Natural Gas and LP Gas 2013-2027,” 197. 
 
9 In mid-2011, the production of natural gas in Mexico was 6.719 billion cubic feet per day, 
which represented 3.5 percent less than the extraction reported by PEMEX for the same 
month in 2010; please note that, for 2011, the 7 billion cubic feet obtained on average 
during 2010 could not be exceeded. 
 
10 This concept refers to the lack of infrastructure for collecting and processing natural gas 
obtained through the extraction of oil; instead, PEMEX releases the gas into the 
atmosphere. During the last year, gas worth an equivalent of 300 million dollars was 
vented. PEMEX has indicated that it needs to invest around 15 billion Mexican pesos to 
achieve maximum beneficial use of the natural gas that it produces. 
 
11 It is within this context that the government in power conceived of the gas pipeline 
project “Los Ramones,” one of the largest projects in the gas industry. It will have a strategic 
function by bringing together demand and consumption between the south of Texas and 
the northern part of Mexico. In December 2014, the project completed its first stage with 
114 kilometers of pipeline connecting Agua Dulce, Texas and Los Ramones, Mexico. 
 
12 According to the explanatory preamble both of the constitutional reform as well as of the 
Hydrocarbons Act, the Mexican state established its goals of increasing the current 
production of natural gas from 5.7 billion cubic feet per day to 8 billion in 2018 and to 10.4 
billion in 2025, and of achieving rates of replacement of proven reserves of oil and gas of 
more than 100 percent. This means that the increase in production would be accompanied 
by the discovery of the same or larger volumes of reserves. 
 
13 Mexico tends to define itself as an oil country, although it also a gas country (among the 
20 largest producers worldwide). Mexico has one of the lowest costs of production of 
discovery and development, and the rate of replacement of hydrocarbons is close to 90 
percent. 
 
14 Pursuant to the terms of Articles 25, 27, and 28 of the Constitution, activities of 
exploration and extraction of hydrocarbons represent strategic areas over which the state 
exercises economic stewardship, maintains ownership of the subsoil on an inalienable and 
imprescriptible basis, excludes the granting of concessions, and can operate through 
productive state-owned companies (PEMEX). See Articles 1 and 5 of the Hydrocarbons Act, 
published August 11, 2014, in the Official Gazette of the Federation. 
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15 In the case of the natural gas industry, the participation of third parties through other 
productive state-owned companies is also permitted. See Article 6 of the Hydrocarbons 
Act. 	
16 See Article 27, Paragraph Six; Transitional Article Four, Transitional Article Six, last 
paragraph, and Transitional Article Nine of the decree of constitutional reform, published 
on December 20, 2013, in the Official Gazette of the Federation; and Articles 13, 15, 23, and 24 
of the Hydrocarbons Act. 
 
17 See Articles 5, 48, 49, and 80 of the Hydrocarbons Act, published on August 11, 2014, in 
the Official Gazette of the Federation, and Article 11 of the Regulation of Title Three of the 
Hydrocarbons Act, published on October 31, 2014, in the Official Gazette of the Federation. 
 
18 See Article 83 of the Hydrocarbons Act and Article 50 of the Regulation of Title Three of 
the Hydrocarbons Act. 
 
19 See Article 7 of the Regulation of Title Three of the Hydrocarbons Act. 
 
20 See Article 8 of the Regulation of Title Three of the Hydrocarbons Act. 
 
21 See Article 56 of the Hydrocarbons Act. 
 
22 See Article 71 of the Hydrocarbons Act. 
 
23 See Article 84, Section X of the Hydrocarbons Act. 
 
24 See Article 28 and Transitional Article Eight of the Hydrocarbons Act. 
 
25 See Article 60 of the Hydrocarbons Act. 
 
26 See Article 56 of the Hydrocarbons Act. 
 
27 See Articles 60, 70 through 75, and Transitional Article Fifteen of the Hydrocarbons Act. 
 
28 See Article 84, Section X, of the Hydrocarbons Act. 
 
29 See Articles 81 Section II and Article 82 of the Hydrocarbons Act. 
 
30 See Article 83 of the Hydrocarbons Act. 
 
31 See Article 13 of the Hydrocarbons Act. 
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32 See Transitional Article Ten of the decree of constitutional reform, published on 
December 20, 2013, in the Official Gazette of the Federation. 
 
33 See Article 28, Paragraph Eight; Transitional Article Ten; and Transitional Article Twelve 
of the decree of constitutional reform. 
 
34 See Article 60 of the Hydrocarbons Act. 
 
35 See Transitional Article Sixteen of the decree of constitutional reform and Article 69 and 
Transitional Article Twelve of the Hydrocarbons Act. 
 
36 Please note that in 2000 (sic) the industry legislation was reformed, although this was 
particularly focused on promoting renewable energies without modifying the industry 
scheme of opening described in this section, and therefore no reference is made to this 
regulatory change. 
 
37  It is estimated that over the next 10 years, the consumption of electric energy will grow 
by an average of 3.8 to 4 percent per year. See Viscini and Shortell, “A Brighter Future.” 
 
38 Emissions of greenhouse effect gases are estimated to be 38 percent per capita higher 
than the average in Latin America and the Caribbean. See Viscidi and Shortell, “A Brighter 
Future.” 
 








41 See Viscini and Shortell, “A Brighter Future.” 
 
42 Federal Electricity Commission, “Operational Indicators.” 
 
43 Ministry of Energy, “Forecast of the Electrical Sector 2013-2027,” 33. 
 
44 The generation effectively obtained from plants owned by the CFE and the private sector 
in 2009 amounted to 245,589 GWh. Of this quantity, 74 percent was intended for energy 
sales (public service); 4 percent was supplied to industrial, commercial, and service 
companies and local governments by private permit holders; 4.4 percent was used in the 
same generating plants; and 17.3 percent was system losses. Discounting the last two items, 
it is estimated that approximately 5.1 percent of the energy consumed in the country was 	
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produced by companies holding self-supply, cogeneration, and self-use permits and the 
remainder by the CFE and PIES, 55.3 percent and 39.6 percent, respectively. Estimated 
numbers based on information from the “Forecast of the Electrical Sector 2010-2025.”  
 
45 Ministry of Energy, “Forecast of the Electrical Sector 2013-2027,” 85 and 93.  
 
46 Pursuant to the terms of Articles 25, 27, and 28 of the Constitution, the planning and 
control of the constitutional electrical system represent strategic areas with respect to 
which the state exercises economic stewardship, protecting the security and sovereignty of 
the nation; the granting of concessions is excluded; and the state can operate through 
productive state-owned companies (CFE). See Articles 13 through 16 of the Electrical 
Industry Act, published in the Official Gazette of the Federation on August 11, 2014. 
 
47 See Articles 25, 27, and 28 and Transitional Article Eleven of the Constitution. Pursuant to 
the terms of Articles 25, 27, and 28, the activities of exploration and extraction of 
hydrocarbons represent strategic areas with respect to which the state exercises economic 
stewardship, maintains ownership of the subsoil on an inalienable and imprescriptible 
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